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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
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Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. Defendant invoke his right to remain silent unequivocably.
The officer fail to honor his right to remain silent and continued his
interrogation.
After advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the defendant
equivocably invoke his right to counsel but the officer continued to interrogate
without first seeking to clarify whether the defendant wanted counsel present.
The officer told the defendant that he would not use the statements
given against him. Defendant seeks a suppression of the statements.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant is charged with Possession of PornographyExploitation of a Child. He entered a 'Sery Plea' preserving the right to appeal
the motion to suppress. The State agreed via the 'Sery Plea' that the charge
herein would not be sustained except through the introduction of the statement
taken from the defendant. Defendant argues that it violated his Fifth
Amendment rights and Art. I Section 12 of the Utah State Constittution.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
(The case is presented via the transcript of the initial contact with the
officer and the subsequent interrogation. This Court should give the trial court
no deference since the facts are presented in transcript form.)
Officer Jackson, Spanish Fork Police, learned of a possible sexual
relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter, referred hereafter as E.
The report was reported October 10,2004. E.'s friend reported it to her
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parents and the parents then contacted Jackson. Officer Jackson contacted
the stepdaughter and interviewed E.
Jackson set up a pretext phone call with the defendant. Nothing of note
was produced by this phone call. Officer Jackson the instructed E. to Mr.
Barrett pick her up at the friend's home. As Barrett approached the friend's
home, Jackson awaiting his arrival. As Barrett walked up the sidewalk,
Jackson stopped him and informed him that he needed to speak with him.
Preliminary Hearin (PR). Page 19 Line 25. P.H. page 41 Line 12.
Jackson was identified himself as a police officer. P.H. Page 19 Line
14. Back up officers had already been called. Suppression.Hearing (S.H).
Page 22 Line 6. Page 43 Line 7/Interview Page 8 Line 209.
Mr. Barrett was then placed into the officer's patrol car. This was an
alternative to taking him to the police station. S.H. Page 1 Line 12. The officer
advised the defendant he was under arrest at this time. P.H. Page 18. Line 25;
Page 21 Line 3-14; Page 42 Line 19.
Without any Miranda advisements being given, the officer commence
an interrogation. Interview transcript Page 3 Line 73/76/78; Page 2 Line
40/44; Page 5 Line 111; Page 6 Line 152/160; Page 7 Line 165.
Without the advisement, Barrett then invoked his right to remain silent.
To the officer's first questions, Mr. Barrett advised Jackson that he would
"rather not say anything." Interview transcript Page 3 Line 74. Jackson
continued despite Barrett's request. No effort was made by Jackson to clarify
this advisement that Barrett did not want to speak with him.
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The transcript of the initial arrest/detention is confirms 1) defendant
had to stay with Jackson (Jackson tells defendant that he must understand
that you are staying with me. You have to hang out with me). 2. Barrett could
not leave. Someone had to come get his car.. He told Barrett someone else
was going to have to pick up his truck. Interview Page 14 Line 361.3. Jackson
advised Mr. Barrett that another officer was obtaining a search warrant to
search the defendant's property. (See Interview Page 5 Line 134; Interview
Page 6 Line 148. Page 7 Line 168; PR Page 1 Line 12).
Jackson controlled the environment. When Barrett wanted to talk with
his wife. Jackson advised:" Okay. I want you to understand you're gonna stay
with me . . .". Interview Page 8 Line 202; Page 6 Line 148. Jackson
restricted the time he could visit with his wife. Interview Page 14 Line 354.
At the defendant's home, Jackson told Barrett's wife that Mr. Barrett
will be taken to jail that night. Interview Page 12 Line 307. Jackson told Barrett
to retrieve his property from his room. Interview Page 13 Line 335. Barrett
was even monitored by the police using the restroom. Interview Page 13 Line
344. At Line 341. Jackson states: "/ want you to understand you're under
arrest, okay."
Still no advisement per Miranda had been given.
Defendant was thereafter transported to the police department. Barrett
was then placed in an interview room. In the interview room, Jackson then
finally advised him of his rights per Miranda. P.H. Page 21 Line 3-14; S.H.
Page 23 Line 15.
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In direct contradiction of the protections via the Miranda protections,
Jackson stated that what he and Barrett discuss would stay between them.
Interview Page 7 Line 177-178. Jackson is quoted as stating:
"So I guess what I'm asking is, if things have happened, I'll keep
it between us"
After being advised of his Miranda rights, Barrett wanted to ask
questions. The following dialogue took place:
Officer: Having those rights in mind, I'd like to talk to you. Is that
okay with you?
Mr. Barrett: Yes.
Officer: Okay
M. BARRETT. Can I ask a question first?
OFFICER. Sure.
Defendant then reports he may want a lawyer but did not want to take
any funds away from the family. It is reported:
BARRETT. I'm guilty, off the record. I'm guilty, alright. Uh, I'm
not gonna fight being guilty, but although I could afford an
attorney, I'm not gonna take any money away from Deb, so I'm
not gonna draw any, off of any resources of our household. So if I
admit guilt, there will be no trial to establish my guilt, correct?
Officer Jackson then starts to give legal advice. It continues:

OFFICER. Kay. Here's how it works. You're, you' re concerned
about a trial. Now I'm not gonna try to lead you down any path on
what you should or shouldn't do.
BARRETT. No, don't worry. I'm not.
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Jackson then acknowledges that he may have crossed a line. He
reports that he will not use what is stated against him:
OFFICER. Cause I'm kind of walking a fine line. What happens is, is
BARRETT. I'm not gonna use what you tell me against you.
OFFICER. Just like I say to you.
The officer then continues advising the defendant respecting criminal
procedure:
OFFICER. Urn, you have the choice whether to plead guilty or
not guilty. That's up to you. That's your choice.
Barrett. Correct.
Officer. If you plead not guilty, is when the trial would happen.
BARRETT. Right.
OFFICER. If you plead guilty, there is no trial.
BARRETT. To establish my guilt?
OFFICER. Yeah.
BARRETT. Correct.
OFFICER. You
BARRETT. And that's what I was trying to establish.
OFFICER. Yeah.
Barrett then attempting to clarify the consequences of speaking states:
BARRETT. So anything that I, if you don't mind at least telling me
the answer to this, anything I say to you could be used against
me, but since I'm already admitting guilt.
OFFICER. It would only be used in trial.
Barrett. What could be used against me? I mean, I'm already. I'm
not gonna go to trial....
Jackson then tells him that he may discredit E.'s statements.
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OFFICER. Now when I go to file the charges and decide which
codes have been violated, stuff like that, maybe she's off a little
bit. May what she's saying happened, didn't happen, how many
times it happened, maybe she's off a little bit. So I compare what
you say as opposed to what she said and try to figure out where
the best fit is. Let me tell you this, I don't wanna charge you with
anything you haven't done.
BARRETT. Well thank you.
OFFICER. That should be common, I, you should expect that.
BARRETT. That's ?? I'm glad you don't.
OFFICER. But the reason I bring it up is, when she sits here.
Barrett then questioning the officer states:
Barrett. ?? trying to get in a fight with me, you're not gonna try
and screw me over, right?
OFFICER. No,no, Officer. ...
Pursuant to the statement the defendant was charged with both the
'rape of a child' and 'exploiting a minor'. Defendant seeks a suppression of
reported statements. The statements are the sole basis of the conviction of the
defendant for' rape of a child'.
The subsequent search of his computer resulting from his statements
disclosed the basis for the charge of 'exploiting a minor'.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant interrogated the defendant in a custodial setting.
Immediately the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. The officer
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ignored the defendant's right to remain silent and continued his custodial
dialogue. After a considerable length of time, the officer finally advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant further invoked his right to
remain silent in a more equivocal manner. He also equivocally invoked his
right to counsel. The officer continued with the interrogation although he was
constitutionally required to stop the interrogation.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION FOR PURPOSES OF MIRANDA
Defendant contends for the purposes of Miranda that the defendant is
'in custody' at the initial contact. In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah
1996), a highway patrolman stopped a defendant for speeding. The trooper
asked the accused to enter the officer's patrol car to observe the speed
reading on the radar unit. In the car, the officer detected an order of burned
marijuana and accused him of smoking marijuana. The trooper than
instructed him to go get the marijuana or the officer would. Defendant
retrieved the marijuana. The trooper then searched the defendant's car finding
additional drugs and paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed evidence and
the State appealed.
The appellate Court held:
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for Miranda
purposes is well-settled. "[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
10

applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to 'degree
associated with formal arrest'... More specifically, Miranda warnings
are required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that
they "exert[] upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently impair
his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination.
In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed four (4) determining factors originally pronounced in Salt Lake City
v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983):
(1) The site of interrogation;
(2) Whether the investigation focused on the accused;
(3) Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and
(4) The length and form of interrogation.
Addressing these four determinative factors, defendant notes:
(1) As Barrett walked up to the house, he was confronted by the
officer and immediately taken to the patrol car. The officer noted this was an
alternative to taking him to the police station.
(2) The focus of the investigation was on the defendant exclusively.
He was the only target. E. had identified him only. There was no one else to
question. The investigation was limited to interviewing the defendant and
obtaining his statement. Defendant denied the allegation. He advised the
officer that he choose not to talk with him.

n

(3) The officer detained him further for the express purpose of arrest
and continued interrogation. Barrett could not leave; the only way he was
leaving was with Jackson. He could not communicate with his spouse or E.
To even urinate, he was monitored. Both Jackson and Barrett knew he was
under arrest in the police car. Barrett had no choice but to submit.
(4) The interrogation/detention began in the officer's car and
continued at his home and then at the police station.
THE PRESUMPTION IS AGAINST THE WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
In North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979) the Court held
that "the courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights" .and
noted that the "prosecution's burden is great" in overcoming this presumption.
The defendant should be given the benefit of every reasonable presumption
against waiver. See also State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1986);
In Tauqe v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980), the Court instructed:
This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of
constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and
we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody
interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the
isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place
and has the only means of making available corroborated
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation,
the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
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This is further confirmed by State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, Utah
1987, (cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044,108 S. Ct.).
INVOCATON OF RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
After being place in the police car, defendant invoked his right to remain
silent— / would rather not say anything. The officer ignored this right and
continued the custodial dialogue-- attempting to secure incriminating
statements.
Continued interrogation, after invocation of the right to counsel, was
addressed by Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). There the defendant
had invoked his right to counsel one day. The officer then terminated the
interrogation. However, the next day, officers came again to him; stated that
they wanted to talk with him and again informed him of his right. Defendant
then waived his right to counsel and spoke with the officers.
The Court found that once the right to counsel is invoked, it must be
honored; no further questioning can occur. The Edwards Court held:
An accused, such as petitioner, having expressed his desire to deai
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.
13

In State v. Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997), faced the same
issue presented in Edwards. There the defendant, prior to being advised of
his Miranda warnings, told the officer that he would like an attorney present.
The officer thereafter, as here, advised him of his Miranda rights. The
defendant agreed to talk with a lawyer present. Instead of terminating the
interrogation, the officer continued a dialogue. Dahlquist then questioned the
officer about the purpose of the interrogation. The Court suppressed the
statements finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted that
the interrogation should have been stopped until counsel was present or he
definitively waived his right to counsel. But as here, the officer continued his
conversation with Dahlquist finally eliciting an incriminating response. The
Court found that by continuing the custodial dialogue, the officer violated
Dahlquist's Miranda rights and the statement should be suppressed.
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT V. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Miranda right to remain silent and the right to counsel are
indistinguishable. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993).Once the
defendant invokes his right to remain silent as the right to counsel, they must
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be scrupulously honored. The officer cannot simply ignore the request. The
interrogation must stop. The officer cannot continue a dialogue. Any police
strategy or trickery not honoring the right to remain silent is unconstitutional.
Missouri v. Seibert. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). See also comments in State v.
Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997) addressing such strategies.

UNEQUOVICAL OR EOUOVICAL INVOCATION OF RIGHTS

1 . UNAMBIGUOUS
Defendant invoked his right to remain silent in unambiguous terms by
stating that he would rather not say anything. Other Courts have held this
language unambiguous. See Cannadv v. Duqqer, 931 F.2d 752,754 (11 th Cir.
1991) where the defendant sated that "I think I should call my lawyer"; Kver v.
Carlton. 146 F.3d 374,376,379 (6th Cir. 1998) defendant stated "I'd just as
soon have an attorney". See also Shedelbowser. V. Estelle. 885 F.2d 570,
571 (9»h Cir. 1989).
In State v. Marshall. 642 N.W.2d 48 (Minn.App. 2002), the Court
found the statement, "No. I don't wish to say anything," constituted an

15

unambiguous invocation of the respondent's constitutional right to remain
silent, requiring police to cease the interrogation.
2. AMBIGUOUS INVOCATION
Recognizing the presumptions against waiver, Courts recognize there
may be an ambiguous invocation of the rights. In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d
1100 (Utah App. 1990), the Court found the statement "Well, uh, should I have
a lawyer" arguably invoked his right to counsel. The Court's logic was set out:
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court stated: "If [defendant]
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning." .. .Thus, a defendant's "request for counsel may be
ambiguous or equivocal,".. and still qualify as an invocation of
Miranda rights.
The Court referred to a prior holding in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965
(Utah Ct.App. 1988) where during the interrogation, the defendant stated:
"This is a lie. I'm calling an attorney." The Griffin Court found this statement
arguably invoked the right to counsel.
The Griffin Court cited other jurisdictions finding similar statements to
invoked the right to counsel. In United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124,1127
(5th Cir. 1984) found "Maybe I should talk to an attorney before I make a
further statement." to be an equivocal requests for counsel. In United States v.

16

Fouche. 776 F.2d 1398,1405 (9th Cir. 1985) I "might want to talk to a lawyer"
was found equivocal as well. Others finding the statements an equivocal
request were United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681,683 (E.D.N Y
1981) "maybe it would be good to have a lawyer"; Cheatham v. State, 719
P.2d 612,618 (Wyo. 1986) (after being asked if he wanted to talk, defendant
responded "Well I don't care, I'd like to see a lawyer, too you know"); Hampel
v.State. 706 P.2d 1173,1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("I've got one question ..
. [and the question is concerning a lawyer]... how would I be able to get one,
a lawyer?"); People v.Russo, 148 Cal.App.3d 1172,196 Cal.Rptr. 466,468
(1983) ("I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or what."); State v. Moulds,
105 Idaho 880,673 P.2d 1074,1083 (Ct.App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an
attorney"); State v. Smith, 34 Wn. App. 405,661 P.2d 1001,1003 (1983) ("Do
you think I need an attorney?"). See also United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1,6
(1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call to attorney's office in presence of officer
treated as equivocal request for counsel),cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1048,107
S.Ct. 2178, 95 LEd.2d 835(1987); People v. Quirk, 129 Cal.App.3d 618,181
Cal.Rptr. 301,308 (1982) (inquiry by defendant as to whether wife had hired an
attorney treated as equivocal request for counsel).
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The Sampson Court reaffirmed State v. Griffin's mandate—When an
accused makes an arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to clarifying the request.
Any comment referencing the right to remain silent, the officer then
should stop the questioning until he clarifies whether he chooses to invoke the
right or not.
After clearly invoking the right to remain silent initially, the officer
continued with his interrogation. After finally advising him of his Miranda rights,
the defendant stated:
. . . but although I could afford an attorney, I'm not gonna take
any money away from Deb, so I'm not gonna draw any, off of any
resources of our household. So if I admit guilt, there will be no trial
to establish my guilt, correct?
The officer's interrogation should have stopped except to clarify.
Defendant was avoiding a factual discussion with the officer. This has a similar
tone to the interrogation occurring in Hampel v. State cited favorably by State
v. Sampson. In Hampel, 706 P.2d 1173, the defendant stated "Urn, and the
question is concerning a lawyer". The officer there explained the difficulty of
getting a lawyer at that time of night and referred to it as a "whole lot of
rigmarole". Hampel found the defendant arguably invoked his right to counsel
18

and the officer should have stopped. Jackson instead of clarifying gave the
defendant a biased perspective of criminal procedure.
The Utah Court found that the defendant's statement "I ain't got to
listen to you, okay" and 'I ain't got to say nothin' invoked her right to remain
silent. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993). The Court applied
the same standards to remain silent as with the right to an attorney. Miranda
established identical standards for the invocation of either Miranda right. They
found the U.S. Supreme Court required officers faced with an invocation of
either right to terminate their questioning.
Gutierrez applied the same clarification approach followed in
Sampson. Two inquiries are required: (1) Whether an accused 'actually
invoked' a Miranda right; and (2) If so, whether that request was scrupulously
honored". As in Sampson , they elected to avoid officers making the
determination of whether a particular statement met some threshold standard
of clarity and favored allowing suspects to clarify their own remarks. See also
Justice Souter's comment in Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994) finding it
unrealistic to expect a suspect to speak with a discrimination of an 'Oxford
don'. See also State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965,966-67 (Utah App. 1988).
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In State v. Levva. 906 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1995), a trooper
attempted to stop a motorist and the motorist attempted to evade the officer.
The officer immediately handcuffed the driver and questioned him. After
Miranda advisements, the trooper asked "Having these rights in mind do you
wish to talk to us now?". The defendant answered "I don't know.". The trooper
then responded, "You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It is
up to you." The defendant then nodded his head affirmatively. Without further
asked him, "So why did you run?". The defendant then confessed.
The Court noted the officer's responsibility once any equivocal
reference to a Miranda right is given.
Upon an equivocal reference to Miranda rights, all questioning must
cease except for those questions designed to clarify the defendant's
equivocal statement.
The Levva Court held:
The State cannot establish a valid waiver when the defendant utters
an equivocal reference which is arguably a request to invoke his
Miranda rights, unless the state first clarifies the defendant's
equivocal Miranda reference
To allow police to continue
interrogating the defendant and then use the "accused's subsequent
responses to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request itself
is... intolerable,"..., and "would clearly frustrate the purpose of
Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine
the will of the person being questioned." Under controlling Utah law,
defendant's statement and conduct constituted an equivocal
20

invocation of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the trooper's questions
should have been limited to only clarifying questions.
This same analysis was adopted in Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App.
402,857 A.2d 557 (2004). See also State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94,650 N.W.2d
2Q;Tavlorv. State, 274 Ga. 269,553 S.E. 598 (Ga. 2Q01);McDouqalv.State,
277 Ga. 493,591 S.E.2d 788 (2004).
Instead of clarifying whether he wanted to discontinue the questioning
or to have counsel appointed, the officer continued.. The officer even went so
far as to suggest that he was going to work for the defendant in possibly
minimizing the charges.
OFFICER. Now when I go to file the charges and decide which codes
have been violated, stuff like that, maybe she's off a little bit. Maybe
what she's saying happened, didn't happen, how many times it
happened, maybe she's off a little bit. So I compare what you say as
opposed to what she said and try to figure out where the best fit is. Let
me tell you this, I don't wanna charge you with anything you haven't
done.
The officer actually degrades the Miranda advisement by suggesting
the officer would not try and screw him over. He further states "So I guess
what I'm asking is, if things have happened, I'll keep it between us"
This exchange is similar to the exchange in Commonwealth v.
Dustin, 373 Mass. 612,613-615 (1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978).
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There the defendant had been given the Miranda warnings twice one evening,
indicated that he understood them and did not want to make a statement. He
also consulted with two attorneys, both of whom advised him not to talk to the
police. On the following day, while still in custody, the defendant asked an
officer at the jail: "Mf I tell you something about the incident, will I be admitting
my guilt?' The officer replied, 'You are not on the stand and you are not under
oath. You can tell me anything you want to."1
Jackson continues telling Barrett he will not try "screw" him over. And
most curiously, the officer even suggests that the statements would not be
used against him.
BARRETT. I'm not gonna use what vou tell me against you.
OFFICER. Just like I say to you.
CONCLUSION
When the defendant is placed in the patrol car he is in custody. Prior to
any interrogation, Miranda mandates a proper advisement of his rights.
Although no advisements were given, the defendant Immediately stated he
would rather not speak to the office. The questioning should have stopped. It

22

was an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silence. All statements
obtained after should be suppressed.
After invoking the right initially, defendant again referenced the Miranda
rights by stating that he could obtain a lawyer but did not to take money from
the family. Defendant equivocally invoked his Miranda right to counsel. The
officer again should have stop the questioning and asked him if he wanted to
get an appointed lawyer or stop the interrogation.
Instead of terminating the interrogation, the officer actually degraded
the Miranda advisement by suggesting that he would not use any statements
against him at trial.
If the word attorney' or comrcieiitaboiJt 'remaining silent' is made, the
officer should stop the interview. If the terminology used is equivocal, any
further discussion should be to clarify only. If the terminology is unambiguous,
the questioning should stop without further dialogue.
Dated t h i s j j ^ day of January, 2006.
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Addendum
1. FIRST THREE PAGES OF INITIAL INTERVIEW

Jamestown Square, Clocktower BIdg.
3325 N. University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Phone number # 801-375-9801

/

JJ

Detective John Jackson

MB

Michael Barrett

DB

Debbie Barrett

JJ

Lock that up. If you want, we can just talk in the jeep, we don't have to go back

2

down to the police station.

3

MB

Okay. What's your name again?

4
5
6
7
S
9
10
11

JJ
MB

John Jackson. I handled the ?? situation with Bubba.
(Talking on cell phone - ??, okay. Okay. Okay, Alright, Detective Jackson's um
wants to ask me some questions. He's down here. He knows all about this and he
wants to talk to me for a minute. I don t know what's goin on, but uh. I, I said, I
don V know what this is all about, but he wants to talk to me about something.
Kay. ?? ?? ?? ?? I don't know what's goin on. I'll call you later, okay. I don V
have any idea honey. ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? I don 7 know what it is. I'll call you
when I know, okay? ?? )

12

JJ

I appreciate you talkin to me so cooperative-like.

13

MB

Why wouldn't I?

14

JJ

I'm just gonna pull up here and get out of the front of their house for a minute.

15

MB

I wondered what you were doin. I wondered why somebody was comin around

16

the corner there.

17

JJ

Some whacko parked in the jeep, huh?

18

MB

Well, I didn't know what was goin on. 1 thought geez.

19
20

JJ

Let's pull in this parking lot here for minute. Michael the reason I wanna talk to
you, the reason I think it's so important that I talk to you right now is I've actually
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spent about the past two hours with Erica.

22

MB

Okay.

23
24
25

JJ

She's told me and told her friend, told her friend's parents about your and her
relationship and some things that have gone on that she feels aren't right and she
M Barrett
October 10. 2004
wanted me to talk to you about. Uh, it's only fair, I mean, I've
spentInterview.
the last

Pg J

couple of hours with her. She's kind of on a break down right now. She's not
with it. She's kind of struggled a little bit. I wanted to talk to you and kind of get
your version of you guy's relationship and kind of see maybe where these things
are comin from. Understanding, I know, I'm fiill aware that these kids haven't
had an easy path. I understand that, with their real dad and Phillip and his
situation with his older sister
MB

Mm-hmm.

JJ

I understand that.

MB

Mm-hmm.

JJ

Uh, but I'm gonna be flat out blunt with ya, Erica's disclosed that there's been a
relationship between you and her that hasn't always been down the straight and
narrow. Now, what I wanna do, hopefully, is keep this low-key. I don't like these
public investigations and stuff like that.

MB

Mm-hmm.

JJ

So that's why I asked you to come talk to me tonight, maybe get your side of you
guy's relationship. I don't know what your wife told you about Phillip's case. I
never really talked to you, I talked to her more than anybody, but

MB

Mm-hmm.

JJ

I'd just as soon get the facts and get em out and get it done. So, uh do you know
what Erica, do you guys get along real well?

MB

Who?

JJ

You and Erica?

MB

Well, yeah, like anybody, any stepdaughter and her ??, any stepfather and her
daughter, you know.

JJ

She's actually surprised me when I asked her how her relationship with you was.
She, she thought pretty high of ya. Well, I shouldn't say thought, thinks pretty
high of you.

MB

Yeah, she, she considers me her dad.

JJ

Yeah, she, I noticed that she calls you dad
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55

MB

Yeah, she does.

56

JJ

And father and

57

MB

Yeah.

58

JJ

But you

59

MB

Well she calls me dad, yeah.

60

JJ

Help her with school, help her with things, you know, raisin a teenage daughter's

61

not easy, I know.

62

MB

Yeah, I've always helped her with school, with her school work.

63
64

JJ

So she talked real high of ya. What she's disclosed to me tliough is a relationship
between you guys that's turned sexual and whether those things are natural,

65

whether they've, I don't know.

66

MB

?? I don't know what she said, but

67

JJ

Well, ?? ?? ?? is to go through this whole investigation I just put her in front of a

68

videoed recorded interview.

69

MB

Mm-hmm.

70
71
72
73
74

JJ

And she bawled for a couple hours about some things you guys do at the
warehouse, at your house. And uh she had a pretty rough time with it. I have no
reason to doubt her, but yet, I really can't make any decisions until I talk to you,
so I was hopin you'd kind of give me your version of those relationships.
I don't know what she said. I, Fd rather not say anything. There's, there s no

MB

75

relationship between us, other than the daddy-daughter thing. I mean, we

76

JJ

She basically said you guys have sex.

77

MB

She's, she's blowin it out of proportion. That's not true.

78

JJ

Okay. What's she blowin up?

79
80
81

MB

Well, I don't know what she said. I don't, I'm, I'm not sure what she said. I'm,
Fm, I wanna cooperate with ya
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She said

JJ

